This study analyses the effect of firm characteristics and governance mechanisms on cash holdings for a sample of UK SMEs. The results show that UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility, and institutional investors hold more cash; whereas levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executive ownership hold less cash. We also find that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities, and leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment opportunities. Our findings suggest that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for SMEs with high growth investment opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities.
INTRODUCTION
During the period of 1984 to 1999, UK firms had about 10% of their total assets invested in cash and cash equivalents (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) . This proportion indicates that investments in cash are considerable for UK firms.
Investment in cash, however, is subjected to an opportunity cost. This opportunity cost is characterised by the low rate of return earned on highly liquid assets. The question of why firms hold cash has attracted a number of researchers (see for example, Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008) . Perhaps two of the most notable features of these studies are the absence of consistent evidence on the hypothesised determinants of cash holdings and the lack of focus on the small medium-sized firms (SMEs) 1 .
In this paper we investigate the cash holdings of UK SMEs. We focus on SMEs as the previous studies on the determinants of cash holdings concentrated on large firms. The lack of attention to SMEs is somehow surprising given that they are the backbone of the UK economy 2 and are often characterized as high risk firms. Market imperfections such as informational asymmetry and financial distress are documented as being more serious for SMEs. For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) highlight that SMEs are likely to suffer from financial 1 A notable exception for the focus on SMEs is the study by Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) who investigate the effect of firm financial characteristics on cash holdings for a Spanish sample. 2 According to von Kalckreuth and Murphy (2005) small and medium firms represent around 54% of the gross value added in the UK economy, 56% of employment and 52% of turnover.
distress. Similarly, Whited (1992) , and Fazzari and Peterson (1993) argue that small firms are more likely to be affected by financial constraints (due to limited internal finance and costly external finance) compared to large firms. In addition, transaction costs for small firms are expected to be high (Mulligan, 1997) . With respect to ownership structure, Faulkender (2002) argues that the ownership of SMEs is more varied as opposed to large firms, which provides a better platform from which to examine the agency cost elements associated with cash holdings.
Finally, in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis that led to stringent credit conditions, studying the cash holdings behaviour of SMEs is far more important today than ever before.
The extent to which managers actually have the ability to implement decisions that increase or decrease firm cash holdings depends on a firm's governance structure. The current study incorporates an extensive range of firmlevel attributes for internal governance mechanisms. These governance attributes include board size, non-executives representation on the board, executives and non-executives ownership, and leadership structure. Another important feature of this paper is that we contend that SMEs cash holdings and the effectiveness of governance mechanisms depend on the firm's investment opportunities. It is generally held that firms with high growth investment opportunities face greater information asymmetry and agency costs (Smith and Watts, 1992) . If this is the case one would expect internal governance mechanisms to play a significant role in high growth but not necessarily low growth firms.
To carry out the empirical analysis, the study employs a sample of 368 UK (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Franks, Mayer, and Reeneboog, 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) which makes them ineffective monitors of cash holding decisions. Therefore, in their presence entrenched management can easily accumulate large cash reserves with minimal fear of discharge or discipline. As expected, the results also show that governance mechanisms are not as effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities compared to firms with high growth investment opportunities.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how the existing cash holdings theories can be used to explain the financing decisions for SMEs, and presents the empirical hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of the sample utilized in the current study. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Hypothesis
In their seminal papers Miller (1958, 1963) 
The Trade-Off Theory
The premise of the Trade-Off Theory is that firms set their optimal cash holdings by considering the tradeoff between the marginal benefits and costs of cash holdings (Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Opler et al., 1999) . The marginal benefits are: reduction of the likelihood of financial distress, allowance for the pursuance of investment policy when financial constraints are met and the minimization of the cost of raising external funds or liquidating assets. Similarly, the marginal costs of holding cash are the low rate of return on these assets and possible tax disadvantages. In this context, the Trade-Off Theory implies the existence of an optimal level of cash holdings.
The Pecking Order Theory
The Pecking Order Theory state that to reduce asymmetric information costs and financing costs, firms should first finance their investments with retained earnings (cash), then with debt and finally with equity (Myers, 1984) .
Furthermore, Opler et al. (1999) argue that the Pecking Order Theory implies the absence of an optimal level for cash holdings. As such, cash holding levels fluctuate on the basis of a firm's fortune. Opler et al. (1999) there is an implicit absence of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Jensen (1986) highlights that in the presence of large free cash flows the agency problem between shareholders and managers can be severe. Opler et al. (1999) argue that in the presence of agency problems associated with managerial discretion, management may pursue self interests at the expense of shareholders with cash serving as a catalyst. They argued that management may hold excessive cash reserves because they wish to reduce their personal undiversified risk and pursue their own objectives. Opler et al. (1999), and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis highlights the determinants which provide an incentive for the accumulation of large cash reserves which might not be consistent with firm value maximization.
The Determinants of Cash Holdings
This section elaborates on the firm characteristics which are prominent in the literature as the determinants of cash holdings. Importantly, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) highlight that firm characteristics influence cash holding decisions in different ways in the three theories under consideration.
Firm Size
Since small firms are described as suffering from severe exposure to informational asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998) . It is this exposure which Kim, Mauer and Sherman. (1998) highlight as a factor which contributes to small firms facing more borrowing constraints and high costs of external financing.
Furthermore, small firms are likely to experience financial distress (Titman and Wessels, 1988) . Therefore, firm size is expected to be inversely related to the amount of cash a firm holds, consistent with the Trade-Off Theory. However, the Pecking Order Theory presumes that firm size provides an indication of success.
Therefore, in the Pecking Order world a positive relationship between firm size and cash holdings is expected (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004) . Finally, the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis suggests that large firms have greater shareholder dispersion, resulting in greater levels of managerial discretion over cash holding decisions (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004) . Therefore, where managers of large firms have more discretionary power over investment and financial policy, a greater level of cash holding may be evident; this would imply a positive relationship between cash holdings and firm size. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that firms with high levels of leverage have high probability of financial distress, suggesting a positive relationship may exist between leverage and cash holdings. As such, the relationship between cash holdings and leverage is potentially ambiguous.
Hypothesis 2:
There is an ambiguous relationship between leverage and cash holdings.
Non-Cash Liquid Substitutes
Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that in context of the Trade-Off Theory it is plausible to believe that the cost associated with converting non-cash liquid assets into cash is less, relative to other asset classes.
As such, in the event of a cash shortfall, the presence of substantial non-cash liquid assets provides firms with an internal resource, making it unnecessary to fill shortfalls with trips to the capital markets. Therefore, firms with more non-cash liquid asset would be expected to hold less cash.
Hypothesis 3:
There is a negative relationship between non-cash liquid assets and cash holdings.
Cash Flow Volatility
Opler et al. (1999) argue that firms with greater cash flow volatility are likely to enter in situations where there is a shortfall in internal resources.
Additionally, such a shortfall can incur substantial costs if it results in the abandonment of positive NPV projects. Moreover, Minton and Schrand (1999) argue that firms with a high frequency of cash shortfalls find the external sources of finance expensive. Consistent with the Trade-Off Theory, firms with a greater degree of cash flow volatility will hold greater amounts of cash to lower the expected cost of liquidity constraints (Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 ).
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between cash flow volatility and cash holdings.

Dividends
Within the Trade-Off Theory realm, the relationship between dividends and cash holdings is expected to be negative. For example, Ferreira and Viela (2004) argue that firms with a reputation for paying dividends can raise funds at lower cost (by cutting dividends) as opposed to those not paying dividends.
Therefore, the relationship between cash holdings and dividends is expected to be negative.
Hypothesis 5:
There is a negative relationship between dividend paying firms and cash holding.
Governance Mechanisms and Cash Holdings
To minimize the agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control, a number of governance mechanisms have been put forward (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Ultimately, the purpose of these mechanisms is to align the interest of managers and shareholders.
Board Size
There is no clear consensus in the literature about whether the size of the board of directors matters when it comes to monitoring managers and limits their opportunistic behaviour. For instance, Jensen (1993) argues that large boards tend to be less effective as the involvement of more individuals in the decision making process slows agreements. Yermack's (1996) study lends support to the premise that small boards are more effective than large ones. On the other hand, Lehn, Sukesh and Zhao (2003) contend that monitoring is more efficient with a large board because of greater shared information. In the same vein, Raheja (2005) argues that, as the benefits of monitoring increase, boards will do more monitoring leading to large boards. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) document a positive relationship between board size and firm performance.
Therefore, the relationship between board size and cash holdings is expected to be ambiguous.
Hypothesis 6: There is an ambiguous relationship between board size and cash holdings
Non-Executive Representation Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) highlight that the composition of the board of directors is an important mechanism as the presence of non-executive directors serve as a mechanism to monitor and ensure the interest of executive directors and shareholders are aligned. Furthermore, they argue that this is attributable to the independence of non-executive directors and the incentive for non-executive directors to maintain a good reputation. Additionally, the fear of lawsuits and the market for their services provide further motivation for nonexecutives to be efficient monitors of board decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; McKnight and Weir, 2009 ). Weir, Laing and
McKnight present a positive relationship between non-executives presence and firm performance for a UK sample. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that there is a greater expectation for firms with more non-executives directorship representation to make better decisions.
Hypothesis 7:
There is a negative relationship between non-executive representation and cash holdings.
Executive Ownership and Non-Executive Ownership
Within the paradigm of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, a possible solution to mitigating the problems associated with managerial opportunism is to increase managerial equity ownership (Jensen, 1993) , as this strengthens the alignment of shareholders' and management's interest. 
Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership serves as an external mechanism to further monitor the activities of a firm's management to ensure pursuance of firm value maximization. Pound (1988) argues that institutional investors have resources and expertise in monitoring and evaluating the performance of management at low costs. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that institutional holders mitigate the free-rider problem, perform monitoring functions, and reduce the scope for managerial opportunism. Consequently, Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) argue that institutional investors can reduce the free cash flow in management hands through their active monitoring role. Therefore, firms with high level of institutional owners are expected to hold less cash.
Hypothesis 10: There is a negative relationship with institutional ownership and cash holdings.
Non-Executive Chairman
One of the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code is that the roles of chairman and chief executive should be held by different individuals (see Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVES
There Furthermore, the correlation between QRATIO and MCTA is significantly positive with a value of 0.98 suggesting that the two variables are strong proxies for the investment opportunity set (IOS).
EMPRICAL RESULTS
To examine the determinants of cash holdings for UK SMEs, multivariate regressions are utilized. One possible salient issue with the analysis is that the relationship between cash holdings and its hypothesized determinants are endogenous. To control for the existence of this endogeneity problem, we employ the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1995) Ozkan and Ozkan (2004, p. 2114) , which suggests that UK institutional owners adopt a passive attitude towards monitoring and disciplining firms' management.
Firm opportunity set and cash holdings
To assess the effect of a firm investment opportunity set on cash holdings, the sample of 368 SMEs is split into three sub-samples,based on the following two proxies for the investment growth opportunities: the Tobin's Q (Q-Ratio) and the ratio of market capitalisation to total assets (MCTA). The sample is split as follows: firms with investment opportunity values below the 40 th percentile are considered as low growth investment SMEs, firms with investment opportunity values above the 60 th percentile are considered as high growth investment firms.
The means and the medians of these two sub-samples are presented in table 2. On average, high growth investment SMEs hold larger amounts of cash, are smaller in size, are subjected to greater levels of cash flow volatility, pay less dividends, have low levels of debts and hold smaller amounts of non-liquid cash substitutes, compared to low growth investment SMEs. The difference in means between the two sets is significant at the 1% level.
The regression analysis results are reported in table 5. The sample in models 1 to 4 is split on the basis of Q-Ratio, while in models 5 to 8 the sample is split on the basis of the ratio of market capitalisation to total assets. Non-executive ownership (NEXO) is negative and significant at the 5% level, for firms with high growth opportunities (models 3, 4, 7 and 8). There is also some evidence that the relationship between executives' ownership (EXO) and cash holdings is monotonic and negative for high growth firms (models 3 and 7). This finding suggests that ownership structure plays an important role in mitigating agency conflicts stemming from the cash held for investments. The results also show a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership (INST) and cash holdings, irrespective of the investment opportunity set. This result supports the existing evidence that UK institutional investors are passive and inactive monitors (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Franks et al., 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) .
Therefore, in the presence of institutional ownership, ceteris paribus, management may engage in hoarding cash for self-interest, with minimal fear of discharge.
Interestingly, results in table 5 show that none of the board structure measures (BSIZE, NEXR and NCH) is significant. This suggests that these mechanisms are ineffective in mitigating potential free cash flow problems in UK SMEs.
With respect to firm characteristics, leverage (LEV) is negative and significant at the 5% level for firms with low growth investment opportunities, suggesting that these firms are exposed to capital market monitoring. Leverage, however, does not affect the cash held by high growth investment firms. This finding is consistent with the argument that high growth investment firms are more prone to informational asymmetries (compared to low growth investment firms) which makes external financing such as debt expensive (Myers, 1984; Hutchinson and Gul, 2004) . Therefore, if low growth investment SMEs are subjected to lower informational asymmetries, then leverage might provide a cheaper mechanism with which to monitor management. Finally, the results indicate that the cash flow volatility (CVOL) affects positively the cash held by low growth investment firms.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Most of the current understanding of what determines firm cash holdings
comes from studies that focused on large firms. Given the importance of cash for SMEs and their role in the UK economy, this paper examines the effect of governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on cash holdings for a sample of 368 UK SMEs. Overall, the evidence suggests that UK SMEs hold cash mainly for transaction costs and precautionary motives.
The empirical analysis shows that UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility and institutional investors hold more cash. Conversely, levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executives ownership hold less cash.
Interestingly, when we distinguish between firms with high growth investment opportunities and firms with low growth investment opportunities, the results show that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities; while leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment opportunities. This implies that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for firms with high growth SMEs, whereas external governance mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities. Finally, the lack of support for the hypothesis that the board structure affects cash holdings may be attributed to the UK being characterised as having strong levels of investor protection (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003) . Shareholder might have sufficient legal protection to inhibit management from pursuing self-interests. Therefore, publicly traded UK SMEs might hold large cash reserves and not necessarily incur severe agency costs. All models include a constant and industry dummies. P-values are robust to heteroscedasticity and are reported in parenthesis. Table 1 provides definition for all variables. a, b and c indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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